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The BushAdministration will likely have the opportunity to make
a number of appointments to the Supreme Court; however, such
nominations may lead to contentious confirmation hearings in the
Senate. When such an appointment opportunity does present itself,
questions are bound to arise concerning the appropriate role ofthe
United States Senate in the confirmation of Supreme Court nomi-
nees under the "advice and consent" provisions ofArticle H of the
United States Constitution. Disputes over the Senate 'sproper role
and scope ofinquiry seem to emerge whenever a nominee has faced
the confirmation process and have been a timeworn subject oflegal
debate. In this Article, we assess the proposition that the Senate
should have an active role in the confirmation process, which in-
cludes investigation into a nominee's ideological beliefs and consti-
tutional philosophy. We begin by examining the background of the
Constitution's "advice and consent"phraseology and consider early
applications of the confirmation process by senators during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We then discuss the struggle
for judicial selection power between the Senate and the President
and conclude by suggesting the needfor an active Senate response
to executive nominations.
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L Introduction
A. The Issue
Amid rumors that at least two Supreme Court justices, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, may be
retiring soon, President Bush faces the possibility of a contentious confirma-
tion battle in trying to fill such vacancies on the Court.! Indeed, with regard
to potential Bush appointments to the Court, Robert Bork commented, "Both
sides are set for a pitched battle, and it could be a replay of my experience."2
While appointing a new justice to-the Supreme Court gives the President an
opportunity to create a lasting political and legal legacy, such opportunities
come with considerable political risks in that presidents may lose valuable
political capital from a prolonged battle in the Senate over an ideologically
controversial nominee.
3
1. Viveca Novak, Off The Bench? Think the AshcroftBattle Was Ugly? The War Over
Our Next Supreme Court Justice Could Start Soon, TM, Feb. 26,2001, at 54, 55.
2. Id. at 55. A Bush nominee may experience a particularly contentious confirmation
process given the Court's controversial decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Professor
Bruce Ackerman makes the argument that because the Court essentially decided the presidential
election, and hence potentially arranged for its own succession, the Senate should refuse to
confirm any Bush nominee unless and until Bush wins the 2004 election "fair and square."
Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48.
3. See Charles M. Cameron et al., Cover, & Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCL REV. 525, 528 (1990) (noting that
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When such an appointment opportunity does present itself, questions are
bound to arise concerning the appropriate role of the United States Senate in
the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees under the "advice and consent"
provisions of Article II of the United States Constitution. Disputes over the
Senate's proper role and scope of inquiry seem to emerge whenever a nominee
has faced the confirmation process, and have been a timeworn subject of legal
review.4 Historically, the controversy over the confirmation issue has evinced
the following two major points of view: (1) that the Senate should have a
circumscribed role in the confirmation process and that proper questioning of
nominees should not include inquiries regarding a nominee's policy values or
constitutional philosophy,' and conversely, (2) that the Senate should have an
active role in the confirmation process and that confirmation votes may
legitimately tam on a nominee's response to questions concerning his or her
policy values and constitutional philosophy.6
The debate over the appropriate scope of the confirmation process yields
opinions from a wide spectrum of sources. During the confirmation proceed-
ings of Associate Justice David H. Souter, then Senate Judiciary Chairperson
Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) asserted, 'We have a rightto know and... a duty
to discover precisely what David Hackett Souter thinks on the great constitu-
tional issues of our time."7 Former Chief Justice Warren Burger set forth an
opposing view and questioned the propriety of asking nominees about their
constitutional views, stating:
To call on a nominee for advance views as to questions that may come
before the Court is really not unlike asking a potential juror how he or she
President is active participant in nomination process and may lose prestige, reputation, or popu-
larity when nomination fails).
4. See, e.g., John P. Frank, TheAppointment ofSupreme Court Jusices: Prestige, Prin-
ciples and Politics, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 172. The selection of Supreme Courtjustices is a matter
of pressing public concern as well. One survey, conducted months before the 2000 presidential
election, indicated that a candidate's potential appointments to the Court would be either a
"somewhat' or "very" important factor in 73% of respondents' voting decisions in the upcoming
presidential election. See D. Aomb,,Courting Voters, NAT'LJ., July 15,2000, at 2329.
5. See generally Bruce FeinA Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 672 (1989) (arguing that senatorial investigation of Supreme Court nominees should be
limited to whether nominees are intellectually competent and to whether nomination was tainted
by cronyism, corruption, or partisanship).
6. See generally William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles andDutes of the Senate in the
Supreme CourtAppointmentProcess, 28 WM. & MARYL. REV. 633 (1987) (arguing that Senate
is obligated to conduct broad inquiry into suitability of Supreme Court nominees that encom-
passes their professional qualifications as well as their political values).
7. At about the same time, a newspaper public opinion poll of 1,000 registered voters
found that 75% of them felt that it was appropriate for the Senate to seek Souter's views on
controversial issues. See Tony Mauro & Mimi Hall, Souter Pressed to Make Views Clear, USA
TODAY, Sept 12,1990, atA3, col. 4.
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will decide a particular case that the jury has not yet heard. Atrialiudge
would reprimand a lawyer for such conduct.8
Commentators note that both liberals and conservatives alike support the
ideological inquiry of nominees by the Senate when they dislike the nominee.'
Similarly, both liberals and conservatives deem ideological inquiry inappropri-
ate when the nominee has been to their liking.1° Such capricious assessments
ofthe Senate's proper role are quite possibly inescapable giventhe fact that the
executive office and at least a substantial portion of the Senate likely always
will be controlled by ideologically discordant parties. Commentators, perhaps
concerned over previous contentious confirmation proceedings, have offered
suggestions for revising the process of selecting Supreme Courtjustices. Such
suggestions range from proposals to institute formal reforms in the way the
confirmation process is conducted1 to keeping the process as it is, but funda-
mentally rethinking the way we assess candidates for our highest court.12
B. Defining the Senate's Role
The confirmation process has been implemented in this country for over
two hundred years. Thus, it is somewhat ironic that a dispositive role for the
Senate has not yet been defined. Inherent in the assessment of the Senate's
8. Warren E. Burger, How Far Should the Questions Go?, PARADE MAG., Sept 16,
1990, at 10, 14.
9. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of
Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1291 (1986) (noting political nature of con-
firmation process).
10. Id.
11. Such reforms include (among others) requiring a super-majority Senate vote to con-
firm nominees, curtailing the public nature of confirmation proceedings, and relying on pre-
nomination statements and writings (rather than asking nominees directly) to provide insight as
to nominees' views. Gary J. Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness -A Letter to the Senate on
Advice and Consent, 78 CORNEELL. REv. 619,649-51 (1993). See also JOHNANTHONYMAL-
TESE, TBE SEIINGOF SupREME COURTNOMINEES 146-49 (1995) (reviewing 1989 recommen-
dations of Twentieth Century Fund task force).
12. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, Tim CoNFmMATioN MEss 68-84, 159, 183-86,
203-06 (1994) (discussing various approaches to analyzing nominees). Carter argues that to
avoid "blood on the floor" and to ultimately improve the confirmation process and its results
we should: (1) not dwell on how a nominee might vote if confirmed; (2) not focus so much on
the importance of the Court (and hence the importance of nominees' ideologies), but instead
focus such political efforts toward the popularly elected branches of government; (3) be more
forgiving of nominees' past improprieties; and (4) not presume that nominees are necessarily
qualified for the position. But see Gary J. Simson, Review Essay: Mired in the Confirmation
Mess, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1036-46 (1995) (arguing that Carter's suggestions that focus
undue attention on reducing "blood on the floor" would not actually have effect of reducing
consternation with which he is concerned, and ignore potential threat of presidential domination
ofjudicial selection process).
SUPREME COURT PO WER PLAY
role is the issue of whether Senate inquiry into a nominee's political and
constitutional philosophy is within the proper scope of confirmation investiga-
tion. If it is determined that the Senate should have an active role, then it
seems reasonable that a nominee's political and constitutional views constitute
a proper line of inquiry.13 Although few would argue that it is appropriate for
a nominee to comment on pending cases, there is ostensibly no reason why
nominees should not discuss cases that are already decided or their general
political views. 4 One scholar notes that the premise that such discussions will
inhibit or bias nominees' ability to decide future cases fhirly is no more sound
than the proposition that sitting justices who write precedent-setting opinions
should recuse themselves from voting on similar cases in the future.'i
In this Article, we assess the proposition that the Senate should have an
active role in the confirmation process, which includes investigation into a
nominee's ideological beliefs and constitutional philosophy. Section II exam-
ines the background of the Constitution's "advice and consent" phraseology
and considers early applications ofthe confirmation process by senators during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Section II discusses the struggle for
appointment power between the Senate and the President and suggests the need
for an active Senate response to executive nominations.
I. The Constitutional History of "Advice and Consent"
A. Debate of the Framers
Article IL section 2 of the United States Constitution dictates that "t]he
President... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate shall appoint... Judges of the Supreme Court.... " 6 Thus, although
the Constitution grants the President alone the power to nominate a candidate
for the Court, the appointment power is subject to the Senate's review and
possible rejection. 7 In determining the proper role of the Senate under the
"advice and consent" phraseology, an examination of the aim and intent of the
Constitutional Framers in creating the passage is necessary."
13. See Charles L. Black Jr.,A Note on Senatorial Consideration ofSupreme Court Nom-
inees, 79 YALE L.J. 657,659 (1970) (asserting that consideration of all relevant factors is inher-
ent in giving sound advice); see also Paul A. FreundAppointment ofJustices: Some Historical
Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1988) (stating that issues of Senate's role and proper
scope of questioning are intertwined).
14. Jeffrey K. Tullis, ConstitutionalAbdication: TheSenate, thePresiden, andAppoint-
ments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1331,1347 (1997).
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2.
17. Ross, supra note 6, at 635. Ross adds, "The Constitution says nothing about the
criteria upon which the Senate may base its decision. Technically, therefore, the Senate may
reject a nominee for any reason." Id.
18. Id. But cf Freund, supra note 13, at 1147 ("To be really helpful the record would
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The Constitutional Convention of 1787 saw a variety ofproposals regard-
ing the selection of Supreme Court Justices and debate over the proposals
suffered numerous postponements before the attainment of a decisive vote. On
June 1, 1787, the Framers reached a decisionthatthe President should have the
power, independent of the legislature, to appoint all officers not otherwise
provided for in the Constitution. 9 This broad grant of appointment power to
the President by the Framers was surprising considering the fact that none of
the several states' constitutions gave the governor independent appointment
power.2" This provision, granting appointment power solely to the President,
was amended on June 13, when James Madison offered a motion, subsequently
adopted, that judges be appointed solely by the Senate.2
The Framers' next debate on the issue did not occur until a month had
passed.' However, during the interim, two proposals were made regarding
the appointment power.' William Patterson presented the New Jersey Plan,
which provided for appointment by the executive, who was to be elected by
the legislature. 4 Alexander Hamilton's plan suggested that the executive
should have the power of appointment subject to the approbation or rejection
of the Senate.' Hamilton's suggestion constituted the first time that a method
of appointment similar to the one finally adopted was proposed during the
Convention.26 When the debates recommenced on July 18, opinions were
again divided and the Convention failed to agree on any ofthe new proposals."
Roger Sherman advocated appointment by the Senate, contending:
It would be composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of
course have on the whole more wisdon They would bring into their
have had to deal with the question whether the phrase did or did not have the same meaning in
the contexts of ratification of treaties and appointment of ambassadors, cabinet officers, inferior
federal judges, and members of the Supreme Court. Nowhere did the discussion approach that
level of concreteness.").
19. JAm-s MADISON, JOURNAL OFTiHE FEDmAL CONVENTiON 87 (E.H. Scott ed., Scott,
Foresman & Co.) (1898).
20. JOSEPHP. HARRm, TBEADvCE AND CONSENT OF THE SENAm 18-19(1968). Harris
writes, "In several states the governor had little or no appointment power, in those states in
which he exercised a limited appointing power, it was always with the advice and consent either
of a council appointed by the legislature, or by the legislature itself." Id.
21. Id. at 18. Harris adds, "This division of the appointing power between the President
and the Senate, each to appoint certain kinds of officers, remained in effect until the closing
days of the Convention...." Id. at 19.
22. Ross, supra note 6, at 637.
23. Id.
24. HARRIS, supra note 20, at 21.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Ross, supra note 6, at 637.
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deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be less
easy for a candidate to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magis-
trate.?
Nathaniel Gorham took a different view, arguing:
[Tihe Executive will be responsible, in point of character at least, for a
judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look
through all the States for proper characters. The Senators will be as likely
to form their attachments at the seat of government where they reside, as
the Executive.... Public bodies feel no personal responsibility, and give
full play to intrigue and cabal.
29
Ironically, a compromise plan proposed by Gorham, which closely paralleled
the final plan, was defeated by a 4-4 vote.30
Further debates on July 21 and August 23 proved to be inconclusive and
the issue was not reconsidered until September 4, when the Special Commit-
tee on Postponed Matters made a report providing for executive nomination
of Supreme Court Justices with the advice and consent of the Senate.3"
Debate on the Committee's proposal took place on September 6 and 7 and
although Charles Pinkney and James Wilson voiced opposition to the Commit-
tee's proposal on the grounds that it gave the Senate too much power, the
proposal was agreed to nem. con. by the Framers.32 Supporting the Commit-
tee's plan was Gouvemeur Morris, who had previously advocated appoint-
ment by the executive.33 Morris asserted, "[A]s the President was to nomi-
nate, there would be responsibility; and as the Senate was to concur, there
would be security."
3 4
In examining the Convention's record, it becomes ostensible that the
Constitutional Framers, who had for months retained a proposal granting the
Senate sole appointment power, had not intended to eviscerate the Senate's
vital role in the selection process. Professor Charles Black reaches a similar
interpretation, asserting:
This lastvote must have meant that those who wanted appointmentby the
Senate alone - and in some cases by the whole Congress - were satisfied
that a compromise had been reached, and did not think the legislative part
in the process had been reduced to a minimum. The whole process, to me,
28. MADISON, supra note 19,at 375.
29. Id. at 374-75.
30. Id. at 377.
31. Ross, supra note 6, at 639.
32. MADISON, supra note 19, at 680-81.
33. HARRIS, supra note 20, at 24.
34. MADISON, supra note 19, at 681.
1059
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1053 (2001)
suggests the very reverse of the idea that the Senate is to have a confined
role.a
Black further argues that the Framers contemplated the Senate's active ques-
tioning of a nominee's policy values.3
B. Early Applications of 'Advice and Consent" by the Senate
The proposition that the Senate may actively investigate a nominee's
ideological values and vote against a nominee for political reasons is sup-
ported by the Senate's application of the "advice and consent" phraseology
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the years 1787 through
1900, the Senate refused to confirm twenty-two Supreme Court nominees,
37
often for political reasons.38 As detailed below, the Senate's early practices
evince a historical tradition ofthe Senate as an active and political participant
in the confirmation process.
This role of the Senate as an active and politically driven participant in
assessing nominees traces back to the Washington administration.39 The
Senate's first significant assertion of its constitutional power to reject execu-
tive nominees came not in the form of a judge, but as a candidate for a naval
post.4" The Senate rejected Washington's nominee for a Savannah naval post
as a means of "senatorial courtesy" to the two senators from Georgia, who had
a candidate oftheir own.4 Althoughthis was not a Supreme Court nomination,
the Senate's action in this instance was significant because it established from
the beginning that the Senate could reject a presidential nominee without
regard to his qualifications.42 The second significant Senate rejection occurred
in 1795 when the Senate rejected Washington's nominee for Chief Justice,
Associate Justice John Rutledge.43 Although it has been suggested that Rut-
35. Black, supra note 13, at 661.
36. Black, supra note 13, at 660-63. Black bases his contention that the Framers
contemplated investigation of nominees' ideological values on the Constitutional Convention
record, Hamilton's writings in THE FEDERALIST No. 76 at 494-95 (Mod. Libr. 1937), and early
applications of the confirmation role by the Senate. Id.
37. William G. Myers, Advice and Consent on Trial: The Case of Robert H. Bork, 66
DENV. U. L. REV. 1,2(1988).
38. See Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court.Appointment Process: In Search of Con-
stitutionalRoles and Responsibililies, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551,565 (1986) (noting that ideologi-
cally based nominations face ideologically based scrutiny and opposition).
39. Id. at 563-64. Lively notes that the early Senate's most prominent leaders, including
Senators Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, vigorously opposed the appointment of nominees whose
substantive views they regarded as unsound. Id. at 564.
40. HARRM, supra note 20, at40.
41. Id.
42. Id. at41.
43. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AD PRESIDENTS 65 (1974).
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ledge was prejudiced by rumors of mental instability, his rejection was most
likely due to his opposition ofthe Jay Treaty.' 4 Thomas Jefferson commented,
"The rejection of Mr. Rutledge by the Senate is a bold thing, because they
cannot pretend any objection to him but his disapprobation of the treaty.""
The rejection of Rutledge's nomination for Chief Justice is significant in
revealing the Framers' intentions because: (1) several of the senators who
voted against Rutledge had been delegates at the Constitutional Convention;
and (2) the principal opposition to Rutledge came from the Federalists, who
had favored a strong executive power.'
As Senate rejections of executive nominees during the Washington ad-
ministration laid the foundation for the Senate's role as an active and political
assessor of nominees, Senate rejections based on political grounds during the
nineteenth century fortified this traditional role for the Senate.47 Early in the
nineteenth century, the Senate rejected President Madison's Supreme Court
nominee, Alexander Wolcott, even though Madison's party controlled the
Senate.48 Scholars attribute the rejection of Wolcott to his strict (and contro-
versial) enforcement, as United States Attorney, of the highly unpopular
Embargo and Intercourse Acts.49 President Tyler experienced similar politi-
cally based opposition from the Senate in 1843 when he unsuccessfully
nominated John C. Spencer, a former Secretary of the Treasury from New
York." Unfortunately for Spencer, he had run afoul of the New York Whigs
and the charismatic Henry Clay, who clearly dominated the party against the
politically weak President."1
Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Senate continued to
refuse to confirm executive nominees on political grounds. In 1870, the
Senate rejected President Grant's nominee, Ebenezer Hoar, for political
reasons, most notably his opposition to Andrew Johnson's impeachment.5 2 In
a similar manner, the Senate confounded President Cleveland in 1894 by
44. HARRIS, supra note 20, at 43.
45. Id.
46. Ross, supra note 6, at 642-43.
47. Tullis, supra note 14, at 1348. Tulfis notes that "[d]uring the (nineteenth century),
the Senate rejected or tabled Supreme Court nominations for virtually every conceivable reason,
including the nominee's political views, political opposition to the incumbent President, a desire
to hold the vacancy for the next President, senatorial courtesy, interest group pressure, and on
occasion even the nominee's failure to meet minimum professional standards." Id.




52. ABRAHAM supra note 43, at 118. Other reasons for the Senate's refusal to confirm
Hoar include his refusal to back their partisan suggestions for lower court nominees and his
active labors on behalf ofa merit civil service system for the federal government Id.
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rejecting two of his nominees for the Supreme Court, William Homblower
and Wheeler Peckham. 3 Cleveland had aroused the Senate's ire by refusing
to nominate persons suggested by New York's powerful Senator, David Hill.s
In sum, seventeen of the twenty-one Supreme Court nominees rejected
by the Senate during the nineteenth century were rejected for political or
ideological reasons."5 Hence, a thorough examination of the creation of the
"advice and consent" phraseology and its early implementation by the Senate
provides little support for the position taken by some commentators, that an
active and political senatorial role has no historical foundation.56
11I. The Struggle for Selection Power
A. The President and Senate as Judicial Selectors
As the preceding historical account of the confirmation process tends to
suggest, a very political struggle for judicial selection power exists between
the executive office and the Senate. At the heart of this struggle for power is
the issue of whether the Senate may engage in the same substantive ideologi-
cal screening process that even those advocating a constrained role for the
Senate admit that presidents undertake. 7 As a judicial selector, the President
has the capacity and political incentive to influence significantly Supreme
Court policy through nominations. In the absence of an active Senate response
and ideological inquiry, presidential nominations based on a candidate's
political ideology quickly become rubber stamp appointments, and thus the
President can mold the Court in his own image with no meaningful democratic
check. The American constitutional system is based upon a separation of
powers principle that presupposes that no single branch of the government is
to dominate pervasively." This basic principle is endangered, however, if the
53. Ross, supra note 6, at 643.
54. Id. See generally Carl A. Pierce, A Vacancy on the Supreme Court: The Politics of
Judicial Appointment 1893-94, 39 TENN. L. REv. 555 (1972) (detailing battle over Supreme
Court nominations).
55. Grover Rees II, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings:
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913,944 (1983).
56. For instance, during the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominee Robert
Bork, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) vehemently argued that senatorial ideological investiga-
tions and inquiries of Supreme Court nominees were without historical foundation. See Myers,
supra note 37, at 4.
57. See Richard D. Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court
Nominations: FromReconstruction to the TaftAdministration andBeyond, 5 CARDOZOL.REv.
1, 87 (1983) (considering argument that Senate must consider ideology while evaluating nom-
inees because President does so while selecting them); Fein, supra note 5, at 684 (discussing
appropriate senatorial response to "constitutionally transformative" nominees).
58. Lively, supra note 38, at 563.
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President endeavors to shape the ideological composition of the judiciary and
the Senate merely defers to the President's judgment.59
Advocates of a constrained senatorial confirmation role make the argu-
ment that an active inquiry into a nominee's substantive views by the Senate
threatens to compromise the judiciary's independence and to politicize the
appointment process." However, it is evident that the federal judicial selec-
tion process is already politicized because of the executive office's use of
ideological screening processes in selecting nominees.61 When the President
is guided by political and ideological considerations in selecting nominees, it
seems logical forthe authority obligatedto render advice and consentto review
those same considerations.62 Furthermore, the argument that policy-oriented
debate during confirmation demeans the judiciary ignores a well-established
constitutional principle favoring precisely such a focus.6' The integrity of the
confirmation process is truly demeaned not when the Senate focuses upon a
nominee's ideological views, but when it does so and pretends that it has
not.' This rather uncomfortable selection process, whereby senators actually
vote on nominees based on political concerns while espousing politically neu-
tral reasons, has been labeled by one commentator as "thae mask of nonpar-
tisanship."
65
Another argument advanced in favor of a constrained Senate role is the
proposition that executive nominations based on a candidate's ideological
59. Id. Former Senator Simon (D-Illinois) argued, "In contrast to the President's nomina-
tions to positions within his own executive branch, appointments to the judiciary are to a branch
of government that is supposed to be independent of the President and for a duration exceeding
his own term of office. For the President to control such appointments unilaterally would be
inappropriate, especially in a political system where checks and balances are so important" See
Paul Simon, The Senate's Role in JudicialAppointments, 70 JUDICATURE 55 (1986).
60. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 5, at 687 (arguing that senatorial inquires into nominees'
constitutional philosophies threatens to turn confirmation process into battlefield and negatively
affects quality ofjudiciay).
61. See MALTESE, supra note 11, at 120-28 (examining role of ideology through history
of nomination process); see also R. Brownstein, Reagan'sList ofPotentialHigh Court Justices,
49 NAT'LJ. 2339 (1984) (discussing Reagan-era search for potential nominees that emphasized
conservative credentials).
62. Lively, supra note 38, at 557.
63. Id. at 574-75. Lively maintains that First Amendment constitutional guarantees
depend upon uninhibited public debate, adding, "That central constitutional principle effectively
is subverted to the extent that one branch of government is exempted from the checks and bal-
ances of evaluation and discourse by another branch." Id.
64. Id. See also generally Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the
Confirmation ofSupreme Court Nominees, 13 LAW& Soc'YREv. 927 (1979) (using empirical
analysis to support argument that although senators espouse policy neutral reasons in opposing
nominees, ideological and partisan dissatisfaction are real motives).
65. Carol M. Rose, Judicial Selection and the Mask of Nonparisanship, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 929,931 (1990).
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views are innocuous because the President is unable to predict a Justice's
long-term voting trends.' This premise, however, is not supported by his-
tory' or by empirical studies on the policy impact of presidents' Court nomi-
nationss and belittles the intrusion on the Senate's constitutional role. Lively
concurs on this point, asserting:
The argument that policy oriented inquiry is unlikely to enable the Senate
meaningfully to assess long-term predictability also is unpersuasive. A
president's agenda for instance maybe relatively short term. Immediate
goals, such as Franklin Roosevelt's objective to fashion a Court sympa-
thetic to New Deal legislation, may be at least as significant as quality of
service over the long run... The suggestion that policy-oriented Senate
review is unnecessary because performance is unpredictable... is mis-
placed and perhaps fosters a false sense of security. The unpredictability
premise invites not only deferential review, but also effective displacement
of the Senate's constitutional function and unprecedented enhancement of
executive power and influence.69
Support for this position can be found in the success of the Nixon/Reagan ap-
pointments in building a "law and order" Court. When presidents have
attempted to influence the Court through nominations, their aims usually have
been achieved to a significant degree. 0 Thus, executive screening processes
yield sophisticated performance predictions that threaten the neutrality of the
judiciary." It is only through open debate and a system of checks and bal-
ances between the executive and the Senate in implementing their concurrent
selection tesponsibilities that judicial independence can be maintained.72
66. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 1291. Friedman states, "No matter how important a
Justice's substantive views may be, ideological consideration at the time of his nomination is
futile to the extent that it is impossible to predict what those views will be over the course of
his career on the Court." Id.; see also B. Goldwater, Political Philosophy and Supreme Court
Justices, 58 A.B.A. 3. 135 (1972) (arguing that, because predicting how Justice will vote once
on Court is difficult, presidents' nominations should be confirmed unless nominee is unquali-
fied or has conflict of interest).
67. Frank, supra note 4, at 488.
68. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Lindquist et al., The Impact of Presidential Appointments to
the U.S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting Within Presidential Blocs, 53 POL. RES.
Q. 795 (2000) (assessing President's ability to impact Supreme Court policymaking via appoint-
ment ofjustices).
69. Lively, supra note 38, at 558-59.
70. Id. at 555.
71. See id. at 578 (arguing thatto extentthat nomination process yields functional equiva-
lent of nominees making commitment to President to rule certain way, nomination process
endangers separation of powers).
72. Concerning the magnitude of the appointment responsibility and the need for an active
senatorial review of nominees, Black argues the following:
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B. Senatorial Standards for Rejection of Supreme Court Nominees
Much of the debate on the appointment-confirmation controversy has
concerned the standards for Supreme Court nominee fitness that are to be
applied bythe Senate in deciding whether to reject orto confirm a presidential
nominee." As noted previously, Article II of the U.S. Constitution promul-
gates no criteria restricting the reasons for which a Supreme Court nominee
can be rejected. Therefore, a senator may legally reject a candidate for any
reason that he or she chooses, including politically based objections. How-
ever, such a wide-open standard has received little academic support,74 despite
historical precedent of rejections due to partisan politics."5 The remainder of
this subsection will examine some of the various standards for Senate rejec-
tion that have been promulgated and suggests that the senatorial standard for
rejection should be wide-open to include rejections based upon partisan
politics and ideological opposition.
Commentators and confirmation participants have had a field day pro-
posing various standards for evaluating Supreme Court nominees that they
believe the Senate should confine itself to or at least be guided by.76 During
the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ken-
tucky) set forth what he contended were the appropriate criteria for assessing
Supreme Court nominees. They included: (1) judicial competence, (2) suf-
ficient level of achievement or distinction, (3) judicial temperament, (4) no
violation of existing standards of ethical conduct, and (5) a clean record in the
judge's life off the bench.77 Former Senate Judiciary Committee Chairperson
The Supreme Court is a body of great power. Once on the Court, a Justice wields
that power without democratic check. This is as it should be. But is it not wise,
before that power is put into his hands for life, that a nominee be screened by the
democracy in the fullest manner possible, rather than in the narrowest manner pos-
sible, under the Constitution? ... The Constitution certainly permits, if it does not
compel, the taking of a second opinion on this crucial question, from a body just as
responsible to the electorate, and just as close to the electorate, as is the President
Black, supra note 13, at 660.
73. See, e.g., Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HAR v. L. REV. 1185,1199
(1988) (arguing that Senate should look beyond professional competence and into moral charac-
ter).
74. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 37, at 16-18 (discussing criteria proposed by commenta-
tors).
75. See Freund, supra note 13, at 1157 (noting role of politics in unsuccessful nomina-
tions).
76. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 37, at 16-18.
77. Id. at 16. For a more detailed explanation of McConnell's standards, see A. Mitchell
McConnell, Jr., Haynsworth and Carswell A New Senate Standard ofExcellence, 59 KY. L.J.
7, 33-34 (1970). A standard similar to McConnell's was introduced during the Bork hearings
by the American Bar Association. The ABA based its evaluation of the nominee upon his
1065
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1053 (2001)
Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) called for a different standard, under which a sen-
ator would consider the following: (1) does the nominee have the intelectual
capacity, competence, andjudicial temperament required for a Supreme Court
Justice; (2) is the nominee of good moral character and free of conflicts of
interest; and (3) would the nominee faithfully uphold the Constitution?78
The primary distinction between McConnell's and Biden's standards is
that Biden would include a nominee's constitutional philosophy as a basis of
rejectiom The conflict of standards between McConnell and Biden is repre-
sentative of the primary dispute between those who either do or do not believe
that a nominee's substantive views are a proper basis for senatorial rejection.
Even those who agree that a nominee's substantive views may be properly
considered do not agree as to what extent.
One of the major theories regarding the bounds of ideological rejection
dictates that a nominee may be rejected on ideological grounds only if it is
shown that the nominee's substantive views would be harmful to the best
interests of the nation.79 Although this standard provides a broad basis for
rejection, including ideological opposition, Professor Ross has explained that
this standard would not include rejections based on political pique or narrow
substantive issues."
A similar standard for nominee rejection is the "mainstream jurist" theory,
whose advocates include Robert Bork."' This standard basically requires that
the nominee have ideological support in his substantive views and not be a
"lone wolf' interpretationist.82 It is somewhat ironic that Bork would espouse
this standard because the mainstream jurist theory was at least one of the
(1) professional competence, (2) judicial temperament, and (3) integrity. Under this standard,
the ABA gave Bork an approval rating of"well qualified." Myers, supra note 37, at 18.
78. Myers, supra note 37, at 16-17.
79. See Ross, supra note 6, at 663-64; see also Black, supra note 13, at 663-64 (arguing
that senators must take all factors into consideration when reviewing nominees). Black states
the following:
In a world that knows that a man's social philosophy shapes his judicial behavior,
that philosophy is a factor in his fitness. If it is a philosophy the Senator thinks will
make a judge whose service on the Bench will hurt the country, then the Senator
can do right only by treating this judgment of his, unencumbered by deference to
the President's, as a satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote.
Id.; see also Lively, supra note 38, at 573 (asserting that senators who believe that nominee's
substantive views are dangerous disserve their constituents by failing to reject that nominee).
80. See Ross, supra note 6, at 664. Ross explains, "A senator may properly base his or
her vote upon subjective political choices, however, if that decision is based upon a broad view
of the nominee's record and ideas and a broad vision of the Constitution, rather than upon
narrowly partisan or evanescent issues." Id.
81. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 37, at 18.
82. Id.
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grounds upon which his rejection was based.83 During his confirmation hear-
ings, supporters of Bork presented evidence to show, statistically, that Bork
was "in the mainstream" while sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 4
Opponents of Bork's nomination presented letters and testimony from almost
forty percent of all law professors in the United States, who opposed Bork as
a nominee."' Thus, it is evident that confirmation participants will take great
measures to prove that a nominee is or is not a mainstream jurist.
The standards noted above are only a few of the many that have been
advanced by commentators and confirmation participants. Professor Tribe has
put forth his own unique standard which requires: (1) that the nominee adhere
to the American vision of a just society; and (2) that the nominee not upset the
overall balance of the Court's ideology. 6 Professor Friedman generally
opposes ideologically based rejections, but allows for an exception where a
nominee's views are so repugnant that merely allowing him to voice them as
a Supreme Court Justice would be dangerous.' On the other end of the
spectrum is Professor Rees, who thinks that single issue rejections are appro-
priate under some circumstances. 8 All of these standards call for a limit to
the bounds of senatorial rejection and none would allow for rejection of a
nominee for purely partisan political reasons. These theories ostensibly
assume that standards for rejection of nominees can be enforced effectively.
Below, we suggest that these proposed standards offer no realistically effec-
tive strategy for implementing the Senate's "advice and consent" role and that
a wide-open rejection standard is the most plausible solution to the appoint-
ment-confirmation dilemma.
C. Enforceability of Standards
The various criteria standards that have been promoted by commentators
seek to provide for the Senate a uniform set of rules by which it could con-
strain itself to appropriately based rejections. Inherent in implementing a set
83. See generally Stephen M. Griffin, Politics and the Supreme Court: The Case of the
Bork Nomination, 5 J.L & PoL. 551, 567-82 (1989) (arguing that Bork nomination failed
because of Bork's highly unorthodox views on key constitutional issues).
84. See Myers, supra note 37, at 19. Senator Strom Thurmond urged that Bork had
written over 100 majority opinions and had joined the majority in almost 300 other cases while
on the D.C. Circuit bench. Id.
85. Griffin, supra note 83, at 562.
86. See LAURENCE H. TRIE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLmE COURT 96 (1985).
87. Friedman, supra note 57, at 93-94.
88. Rees, supra note 55, at 947. Rees maintains, "If a Senator believes that a certain con-
stitutional question has a right answer and a wrong answer and that a nominee's wrong answer
could be explained only as evidence of the nominee's tendency to 'make law,' then the Senator
would bejustified in voting against the nominee." Id.
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of rules regulating rejections is the supposition that a set of rules could be
enforced effectively. At present, there are no constitutional or statutory
restrictions on senators' rejection motives. Assuming that a set of criteria for
restrictions could be agreed upon and successfully enacted, they nonetheless
would be impracticable to enforce. The premise that rejection restrictions
would be unenforceable is supported by empirical studies of senatorial rejec-
tions that indicate that Senate opposition to a nominee is often due primarily
to ideological or political influences, despite alleged policy-neutral justifica-
tions given by senators.89 Thus, although a senator actually opposes a nomi-
nee on partisan or policy grounds, he may easily fool onlookers, and perhaps
even himself, by articulating policy neutral opposition. One commentator has
analyzed this dilemma in the following manner:
[A] test based upon "broad bounds of acceptability" or "harmfulness"
may suggest to senators that they may measure a nominee's ideology by
a roughly objective standard. In reality, however, the existence of any
consensus about what is a "reasonable" ideology is problematical. More-
over, the illusion of such a consensus may encourage a senator to delude
him orherselfintobelieving thathis orhervote on a nominee is basedupon
transcendent values when in fact it represents a subjective political
decision."
In short, a set of rules that cannot be effectively enforced serves no realistic
purpose.
As noted above, senators are not under any legal duty to offer justifica-
tions for their rejection of a nominee. This is as it should be. A senator may
very well not be able to offer any articulable reason for rejecting a nominee,
89. See Songer, supra note 64, at 927. Songer notes, "Even if partisan and ideological
dissatisfaction are the real motives for opposition to Supreme Court nominees, the reasons
publicly given for the opposition are likely to deal with alleged defects in qualifications of the
nominee such as ethical impropriety or lack of legal ability." Id. Subsequent research on the
confirmation process indicates that a number of politically based factors influence senators'
confirmation voting decisions, including senators' ideological preferences, constituency pref-
erences, interest group mobilization, and presidents' political strength, among other factors. See
generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests,
Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. 3. PoL. Scm. 499 (1998)
(arguing that interest groups play crucial role in forming senatorial opinion about Supreme
Court nominees); Cameron et al., supra note 3 (assessing impact of ideology, political environ-
ment, and presidential power on Senate confirmation votes); L. Marvin Overby et al., Courting
Constituents? An Analyis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86
AM. POL SCI. REV. 997 (1992) (examining role of constituency preferences in Clarence Thomas
nomination debate); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators,
Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. 1. POL.
SCI. 96 (1992) (arguing that ideology, interest group action, and presidential strength signifi-
cantly affect confirmation voting).
90. Ross, supra note 6, at 633.
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especially if the senator's opposition stems from an intuitive reaction dis-
favoring a nominee. For example, during the Bork confirmation hearings,
several senators appeared to be concerned that Bork was not being forthright
with the Senate about his jurisprudential views.9' Of particular concern were
Bork's claims that he had great regard for, and would follow, legal prece-
dent.' Concerns over Bork's sincerity regarding precedent escalated when
Senator Edward Kennedy introduced tape recordings of Bork's lectures, in
which Bork stated, "I don't think that in the field of constitutional law prece-
dent is all that important.... I think the importance is what the Framers were
driving at, and go back to that."'93 A senator's apprehension about the insin-
cerity of a nominee's testimony would be hard to categorize as one of the
criteria promulgated by the various commentators. However, such anxieties
over a nominee's true constitutional philosophy constitute a valid, yet perhaps
inarticulable, basis for rejection.
Finally, any worries over a senator rejecting a nominee for truly repug-
nant reasons such as racial or gender based discrimination are abated by the
political realities involved with opposition. If a senator articulates such ir-
rational grounds for rejection, he will arouse public scom and suffer political
ruin. If he keeps his reasons to himself, then there is no way to prove that his
grounds were unreasonable anyway. Given the above considerations, we
suggest the use of a wide-open standard for confirmation voting over any
criterion based set of rules.
IV Conclusion
As detailed above, the history of the Framers' debates on the "advice
and consent" provisions of the Constitution indicate that the Framers envi-
sioned an active Senate role in the judicial selection process. Further, early
applications of this provision provide a strong historical basis and precedent
for politically motivated voting on Supreme Court nominees. Although
constraints on the bounds of Senate inquiry of nominees are feasible, con-
straints on senators' true and undisclosed grounds for rejection would essen-
tially be unenforceable. 'Therefore, a likely result of such constraints on
Senate inquiry of nominees would be to promote voting based on hunches and
uninformed guesses as to a nominee's constitutional philosophy and policy
views. Such an undercutting of the Senate's role might also lead to manufac-
tured personal or professional attacks on nominees in a search to find non-
91. See Greenhouse, Senators Question the Sincerity ofBork's New Views, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18,1987,atA22,col. 1.
92. Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to
Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213,1223 (1988).
93. Id. (quoting Judge Bork).
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political grounds for rejection, thus creating more "blood on the floor" during
the confirmation process.9 4
At present, we are faced with the curious situation in which the Presi-
dent's nomination process remains, to a large degree, shrouded and unques-
tioned. At the same time, commentators and confirmation participants have
called for constraints on the Senate's role as an active judicial selection partic-
ipant and on its scope of inquiry. But what would be the likely consequence
of the Senate becoming a politically active participant in the confirmation
process? Given the dominance of divided government in recent decades, the
Senate's willingness to engage in heightened scrutiny of (and opposition to)
presidents' ideologically extreme nominees may actually have the effect of
reducing the impact of ideology in the process.95
Certainly, this appears to be the case with regard to President Clinton's
appointments to the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen R. Breyer.
Clinton's appointments seem to fit the mold of political science studies which
indicate that, holding other factors constant, highly qualified and ideologically
moderate nominees have a significantly easier time gaining confirmation than
do less qualified ideologically extreme candidates.9 However, the selection
of these "confirmable" nominees may have come at the cost of Clinton's
original preference to appoint Justices who may have had a bigger impact on
the policymaking of the Court.97 Hence, while the confirmation proceedings
of Ginsburg and Breyer may have been somewhat tame, this may be a function
of the President anticipating a politically costly confirmation battle and, con-
sequently, making less ideologically driven nomination decisions. If a vigor-
ous institutional role for the Senate in the confirmation process yields such
restraint on the part of the President, then this situation should be welcomed.
Ultimately, it should have the effect of improving the quality of the judiciary,
increasing the legitimacy of the Court; and keeping the law from swinging too
far in either ideological direction.9
94. See Simson, supra note 12, at 1051-52 (arguing that senators opposing Judge Bork's
nomination had to portray him in less than fair light to block nomination).
95. See Simon, supra note 59, at 58 (arguing that President may appoint less ideological
candidates when faced with active Senate scrutiny).
96. See MALTESE, supra note 11, at 150-56 (discussing Ginsburg and Breyer appoint-
ments).
97. Id. Maltese notes that neither Ginsburg nor Breyer was Clinton's first choice for
appointment to the Court Id. at 151. Clinton's original preference was to appoint a politician
who might have possessed the leadership skills needed to forge a moderate majority on the
Court Id. Potential candidates who were ultimately not nominated included New York Gov-
ernor Mario Cuomo and Senator George Mitchell (D-Maine). Id.
98. Simon, supra note 59, at 58. Simon adds, "A president will be thwarted only when
he holds significantly more extreme views than the Senate, and seeks to use judicial appoint-
ments to impose those views."
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